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COMMENTS
Whether the Constitutionality of the Violence




On September 21, 1994, two Virginia Polytechnic Institute football
players forcibly raped freshman Christy Brzonkala in her dorm room.'
The first rapist forced Brzonkala onto the bed, face-up, pushed her down
by her shoulders, and ripped off her clothes. He used his hands and
knees to pin her down and forced her to submit to vaginal intercourse.
Brzonkala tried to push him off, but before she could recover, the sec-
ond attacker raped her. Immediately thereafter, the first man returned
and after raping her again, said to Brzonkala, "You better not have any
... diseases."2
On October 7, 1998, in Laramie, Wyoming, two young men bru-
tally beat an openly-gay college student to death. Mathew Shepard was
found the next day, tied spread-eagle to a fence, his skull bludgeoned,
yet another victim of an apparent anti-gay hate crime. He survived in a
coma for three days before he died. After police officers arrested two
men for this beating, one of the suspects claimed that he beat Mathew
Shepard because Shepard had made a pass at him.3
The commonality of these two incidents is readily apparent to the
lay person, yet our legislature finds these two incidents of violence sepa-
rate and distinct. This is evident if one compares the protection given to
victims of gender-based violence4 with protection given to victims of
violence based upon sexual orientation.5
In 1990, Congress passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act 6 (the Act).
1. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 781 (W.D. Va.
1996).
2. See id. at 784.
3. See Brutal Beating Leaves Gay Student Near Death, MIAMn HERALD, Oct. 10, 1998, at
A10.
4. See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5. See generally Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
6. See id.
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The Act requires that the Department of Justice collect statistics on inci-
dents of hate crimes in America as part of a regular information-gather-
ing system.7 The Act encompasses acts of violence based on sexual
orientation.8 This is merely a statistics-gathering device, rather than true
federal protection for gays and lesbians. Federal protection has, how-
ever, been afforded to women who are the victims of gender-based vio-
lence.9 In 1994, Congress used its Commerce Clause authority to enact
the Violence Against Women Act1" (VAWA), which provides victims of
gender-based violence with a federal cause of action that includes a civil
remedy for damages."
Nevertheless, the VAWA has been met by severe constitutional
criticism. Opponents argue that Congress overstepped its Commerce
Clause powers by enacting the VAWA. The opponents have relied on
the 1995 Supreme Court case of United States v. Lopez 2 to launch a
persuasive attack. In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that Congress
exceeded its Commerce clause authority by enacting the Gun-Free
School Zones Act. 3 Many believe that the Lopez Court implicitly
rebuked Congress for its enactment of the VAWA. Nevertheless, federal
district courts have held almost unanimously that the enactment of the
VAWA was a constitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
powers.' 4 The question remains whether the Supreme Court will
address this issue when it decides United States v. Morrison.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 5 for this case and heard oral
arguments this session. This note contends that the Supreme Court will
hold the VAWA unconstitutional in light of its holding in Lopez. Fur-
thermore, this note maintains that further federal protection for victims
of sexual orientation-based violence directly depends upon the consti-
tutionality of the VAWA.
To examine this issue it is necessary to have a background of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. Section I of this article will focus on the
history of the Commerce Clause and its interpretation, including a close
look at the Lopez decision. Section II is dedicated to the history and
passage of the VAWA. Section III will focus on two key cases regard-
ing the constitutionality of the VAWA. Section IV will delve into the
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902.
10. See id.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
12. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. Id. at 567.
14. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
15. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
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Hate Crimes Statistics Act. Finally, section V will provide an analysis
of the effect the VAWA's constitutionality will have on further protec-
tion for victims of sexual orientation-based violence.
I. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Congress' Commerce Clause power is found in Article I, Section 8,
clause 3 of the United States Constitution. It states, "The Congress shall
have Power . . . [T]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."16 This apparently
elementary clause has generated an ambiguous history of jurisprudence.
1. EARLY COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
The Supreme Court of the United States first defined the scope of
the commerce clause power in the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden.17 In
Gibbons, an action was instituted calling into question the acts of the
legislature of New York that granted exclusive navigation of the waters
within the jurisdiction of that state to two men.' 8 The plaintiff argued
that the state grant interfered with Congress' power to regulate com-
merce among the several states pursuant to the Commerce Clause.19 In a
ground breaking opinion, Chief Justice Marshall held that the state-
granted steamboat monopoly was void because it was in "direct colli-
sion" with an act of congress.20 By doing this, Marshall espoused a
broad view of "commerce. 21
Although the Gibbons Court interpreted "commerce" broadly, it
still struggled with the problem of how far the Commerce Clause power
should extend. Marshall wrote that commerce among the states "cannot
stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced
into the interior. '22 Further, Marshall stated that regulation of intrastate
commerce was "inconvenient" and "unnecessary. 23 In addition, he
noted that the term "among" remained expansive, but it could be limited
to commerce affecting more than one state.24 Therefore, despite the
Court's broad definition of commerce, congressional regulation should
be limited to interstate commerce and should not encroach upon intra-
state commerce. As a result of the Court's broad interpretation of com-
16. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
18. Id. at 2.
19. See id. at 186.
20. Id. at 212.
21. See id.
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merce, Gibbons was a basis for the idea of national economy, and it
served to strengthen the national government.
After Gibbons, the Supreme Court used the Commerce Clause to
check state power and thereby developed its newly established "national
economy." At that time, Congress seldomly used its Commerce Clause
power to regulate industry. Eventually, Congress began to view the
expansion of the national economy and the unrestrained growth of huge
corporations as a call for increased regulation.25 As a result, Congress
enacted the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 along with the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act of 1890. Both of these acts were based upon the Com-
merce Clause. Their enactment was Congress' first attempt to use the
Commerce Clause to regulate commercial activity.
2. LAISSEZ-FAIRE COMMERCE CASES
After these two acts were passed, the Court became increasingly
influenced by laissez-faire economic theories. Laissez-faire economics
sought to limit governmental regulation of business and allow freedom
of contract for the development of business. The new laissez-faire the-
ory altered the Court's perception of the Commerce Clause from con-
gressional deference to limitation on congressional authority.26
The Court's 1895 holding in United States v. E.C. Knight, Co. 2 7
(the Sugar Trust Case) hobbled the Sherman Antitrust Act by distin-
guishing manufacturing from commerce. 28 In E.C. Knight, the Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Company had purchased four sugar refineries,
thereby gaining ninety-eight percent of all sugar manufacturing capacity
in the United States.29 The federal government filed suit against the four
refineries and the E.C. Knight company, claiming that the cumulative
sales of the businesses constituted a monopoly under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.30 The Supreme Court held that E.C. Knight's operations did
not result in a monopoly and, thus, was outside the grasp of the Com-
merce Clause.3" In its holding, the Court reasoned that, although the
manufacturing would eventually affect commerce, such an effect was
only secondary. Therefore, the manufacturing monopoly had only an
incidental effect on commerce.32 As a result of E.C. Knight, many acts
25. See, e.g., Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1397 (1976).
26. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court should not fall prey to laissez-faire economic theories in their decision making); see
generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
27. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 2-3.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 17-18.
32. See id. at 12, 17.
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of Congress that attempted to regulate industry under the Commerce
Clause were invalidated.
3. CONGRESSIONAL DEFERENCE AND THE PENDULUM'S SWING
The effect that laissez-faire economics had upon the Court lasted
until 1936. In 1936, the Supreme Court changed it's position in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.33 This case revolved around the issue
of whether Congress could prohibit, under the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation from engaging in enu-
merated restricted labor practices. 34 The NLRB charged the company
with discrimination because they coerced and intimidated its employ-
ees. 35 The NLRB found the company guilty and ordered them to rehire
several employees.36 When it failed to do so, the NLRB petitioned the
Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order.37 The court refused to
enforce the order claiming that Congress had exceeded its Commerce
Clause powers when it promulgated the National Labor Act.
38
The Supreme Court of the United States surprisingly overruled the
District Court of Appeals, holding that Congress was within its authority
in enacting the National Labor Relations Act.39 The Court eliminated
previous Commerce Clause standards, and it stated that the appropriate
standard requires the Court to determine whether a close and substantial
relationship exists between the prohibited activity and interstate com-
merce.' The Court also held that the company's prohibited labor prac-
tices did have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.41 It
reasoned that if Congress could not regulate the prohibited practices, it
might result in the shutdown of manufacturing plants, which, in turn,
would induce industrial strife.42 For these reasons, the Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act as permissive use of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers.43 The Jones & Laughlin decision marks the entry into
an era where the Court deferred to Congressional authority.
The most extreme decision of this new era of congressional defer-
ence is the 1942 case of Wickard v. Filburn.4 In this case, Filburn, a
33. 301 U.S. 1 (1936).





39. Id. at 30.
40. Id. at 37.
41. Id. at 49.
42. Id. at 41.
43. Id. at 49.
44. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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farmer in Ohio, brought action against the Secretary of Agriculture of
the United States, challenging the constitutionality of the Agriculture
Adjustment Act by claiming that it surpassed Congress' Commerce
Clause authority.45 Congress established the Agriculture Adjustment
Act to control the volume of wheat carried within interstate commerce in
order to prevent possible surpluses and shortages. The surpluses and
shortages would affect the price of wheat, and, in turn, ultimately affect
interstate commerce. 46 The Act allotted a certain percentage of bushels
of wheat per acre to grow on the farmer's land, but Filburn grew excess
wheat to feed his own livestock.47
Despite the fact that Filburn grew the excess wheat solely for his
own consumption, the Supreme Court held that Filburn had violated the
statute.48 The Court reasoned that Filburn's actions would affect the
price of wheat, and thereby affect interstate commerce. 49 The Court
explained that the individual consumption by Filbum was going to fulfill
a need that "otherwise [would] be reflected by purchases in the open
market."50 Thus, the Court established the cumulative effects test,
which permitted congressional regulation of any activity if the aggregate
effects would produce an overall detriment to interstate commerce.5 As
a result of the far-reaching effects of Wickard v. Filburn, Congress
began to regulate other areas that traditionally had been left to the states,
such as crime, the environment, and, most important to our discussion of
the VAWA, civil rights.
4. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,52 the Supreme
Court upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196413 as a permissible
extension of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. 4 In Heart of Atlanta
the appellant was an owner of a small motel in Atlanta and refused to
rent rooms to black people in violation of the Civil Rights Act.55 The
45. See id. at 114-115.
46. See id. at 115.
47. See id. at 114.
48. Id. at 128-29.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 128.
51. Id.
52. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
53. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in pertinent part: "All persons shall be
entitled to full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or nation origin." Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964).
54. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261.
55. Id. at 243.
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motel owner challenged the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act,
arguing that Congress' regulation of a single intrastate motel, local in
character, was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.56 The Court
disagreed with the motel owner, holding that Congress could properly
"prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travellers, however
'local' their operations may appear."57 The Court, following the stan-
dard established in Jones & Laughlin, focused on whether the activity
had a substantial and harmful effect on interstate commerce, not on
whether the activity was local in character.58 The Court explained that
"[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how
local the operation which applies the squeeze."59 The Court recognized
that racial discrimination by innkeepers does indeed effect interstate
commerce because it discourages black persons from engaging in inter-
state travel.6°
The Court reached a similar result in Katzenbach v. McClung.61
Katzenbach involved an owner of a small local barbecue restaurant in
Birmingham, Alabama, who refused to sell to black patrons. 62 The
Court, employing the reasoning of Wickard v. Filburn,6 3 found that,
although the value of the food purchased solely by the barbecue that
traveled in interstate commerce was insignificant, the discriminatory
conduct was representative of establishments throughout the country. 6 4
As a result, the Court held that, in the aggregate, the conduct of discrimi-
nation, if left unchecked, would be likely to have far-reaching harmful
effects on commerce.6 5
5. MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE ROAD TO LOPEZ
Another case that helps our understanding of modem Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is the case of Perez v. United States.66 In Perez,
the Court upheld Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,67 which
makes extortionate credit transactions (i.e. "loan sharking") a federal
crime.68 The case does not fit neatly into the economic activity prong or
56. See id. at 243-44.
57. Id. at 258.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfr. Ass'n., 336 U.S. 460, 464
(1949)).
60. Id. at 261.
61. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
62. Id. at 296-97.
63. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
64. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300-01.
65. Id.
66. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1994).
68. Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
20001
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the jurisdictional limitation prong (later seen in United States v. Lopez).
Rather, like the civil rights cases, it is better used to determine the extent
of deference the Court should grant congressional findings. Perez chal-
lenged the Consumer Credit Protection Act based upon the ground that
Congress' Commerce Clause authority did not extend to the very local
nature of "loan sharking," but the Supreme Court disagreed.69 The Court
relied heavily upon congressional findings that "loan sharking" was a
national concern directly relating to organized crime.70 In addition,
Congress made findings that organized crime used "loan sharking" to
extort millions of dollars from American citizens each year.7" Thus, the
Court held that" [e]ven where extortionate credit transactions are purely
intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate and for-
eign commerce.""
This overview of Commerce Clause jurisprudence demonstrates
that after the nation's period of laissez-faire economics, the Court took a
more deferential approach to congressional regulation under the Com-
merce Clause. After NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and its
progeny, Congress was afforded a broad interpretation of interstate com-
merce when it is for the "good of the nation." This is most evident in the
civil rights cases, where the "good of the nation," an end to racial dis-
crimination, may make the most local of barbecue restaurants subject to
a federal regulation.
As will be discussed below, there is a similar policy argument
behind the constitutionality of the VAWA. Much like racial discrimina-
tion, gender-based violence is a national concern, and it poses a signifi-
cant stigma on the citizenry. This policy argument remains hidden in
both circumstances, oftentimes cloaked in very liberal interpretations of
the Commerce Clause. Nevertheless, as the pendulum swung in the
direction of congressional deference in Jones & Lauglin, so too it may
have begun to swing back. Enter the anomaly: United States v. Lopez.7 3
6. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
On April 26, 1995, the United States Supreme Court issued a
landmark decision that rekindled the Commerce Clause debate and seri-
ously jeopardized portions of the VAWA.74 In Lopez, the Supreme
Court invalidated a congressional Commerce Clause act for the first time
69. See id.
70. Id. at 155-57.
71. See id. at 155.
72. Id. at 156.
73. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
74. See id.
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since 1936.11
Alfonso Lopez had been carrying a gun in a San Antonio, Texas,
public high school.76 Authorities initially arrested the twelfth grade stu-
dent under a Texas law that prohibited possession of a firearm on public
school property. The next day, the state charges were dropped and fed-
eral agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zone
Act. 7 After a federal grand jury indicted Lopez for violating the Act,
the student moved to dismiss the indictment arguing Congress had no
right to exercise federal authority over state schools. 78 The district court
denied the motion, went forward with the bench trial, and found Lopez
guilty. The judge sentenced him to six months in prison, followed by
two years of supervised release. 79 Lopez appealed the decision, arguing
the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed
with his argument, and, based upon what it deemed as "insufficient con-
gressional findings and legislative history," it reversed Lopez's convic-
tion.80 The Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari.
In Lopez, the Court surprisingly concluded that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause.81 The Court began its review of Lopez with a close and
careful discussion of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that even Jones & Laughlin,
Darby, and Wickard confirm that Commerce Clause power "is subject to
outer limits."82 The majority took an unusual approach to Jones &
Laughlin, citing the case for the principle that the Commerce Clause
power "may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them ... would effec-
tually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government."83 In accordance
with that principle, the Court reiterated the rational basis standard of
review for determining whether a regulated activity sufficiently affects
75. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by enacting the Bituminous Coal Act of 1935).
76. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
77. Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990) (making it "unlawful for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone").
78. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
79. See id. at 551-52.
80. See id. at 552.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 556-57.
83. Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
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interstate commerce.84
The Court next reviewed the three categories of activity that Con-
gress may permissibly regulate under the Commerce Clause: the chan-
nels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things traveling within interstate commerce;
and activities that have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. 85 It
noted that the Supreme Court precedent that dealt with the terms "sub-
stantial" and "affect" from the third category was ambiguous. Neverthe-
less, the Court explained that the substantial effects standard is the
proper test.
86
The Court determined that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not
fit into either the first or second category but it did find that the Act was
part of the third category.87 In applying the substantial effect test to the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court focused on previous cases in
which it had upheld Congress' regulation of intrastate activities that
were economic in nature. 88 The Court noted that the Act in question, by
its very nature, was a "criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms. '89 Furthermore, the Court did not find
that the Act was part of some larger legislative scheme to regulate eco-
nomic activity.90 Consequently, the Court determined that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act could not be upheld. The Act was not the regulation
of an activity that arises out of or is connected with a commercial trans-
action, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce.
91
The Supreme Court then proceeded to expose the second flaw of
the Act: the lack of a "jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce."9 " The Court insinuated that a jurisdic-
tional element may very well have rendered the Act constitutional. The
jurisdictional nexus would have limited the Act to the regulation of fire-
arms that "have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce."
93
The Court next considered the legislative findings with respect to
84. Id.
85. Id. at 558-59.
86. Id. at 559.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 559-61.
89. Id. at 561.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 561.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 562.
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the Act.94 It must be noted that the Court's analysis in this area is of
great importance to the question of the constitutionality of the VAWA.
The Court agreed that the Congress is not normally required to make
formal findings as to the substantial effect a certain activity has upon
interstate commerce. 95 The Court added that "to the extent that congres-
sional findings would enable us to evaluate legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here."96 In this unexpected turn in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, the Court seemed to implicitly require congressional findings of
actual, quantitative substantial effect on interstate commerce. These
findings would prove helpful in order to adequately assess the scope of
the case-by-case purview of the Congressional Commerce Clause
authority. This seemingly inconsequential section in the majority opin-
ion may very well be the most important part of the Lopez decision with
respect to the VAWA determination. One could reasonably infer that if
Congress adequately documents and quantifies the substantial effect on
interstate commerce, the Court will uphold such regulation as a permis-
sible exercise of the Commerce Clause authority.
The reader should note the Government's argument regarding the
substantial effect possession of a firearm in a school zone would have
upon interstate commerce. The Government employed a "cost of crime"
argument, apparently trying to revive the "aggregate affects" argument it
used in Wickard and Katzenbach.97 The Government argued that pos-
session of guns near schools could result in violent crime. In turn, this
could deter interstate travel to areas of the country thought to be danger-
ous. In addition, this could raise national expenses through insurance
costs and damage the educational process by threatening the learning
environment resulting in a less productive society.98
The Court rejected the "cost of crime" reasoning, noting that adopt-
ing such an argument would permit Congress to regulate virtually all
activities that lead to violent crime, regardless of their effect on inter-
state commerce.99 The Court also rejected the Government's "national
productivity" argument, finding that, if such an argument was accepted,
then Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens, including family law."°
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 563.
97. Id. at 563-64.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id.
20001
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The Court went on to claim that if it were to adopt the "national produc-
tivity" argument Congress would be empowered to regulate activities
traditionally left to the sovereignty of the states."' 1 The Court stated,
"[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate."" °2
Finally, the Court concluded its opinion by reiterating that "posses-
sion of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce."' 03 Further, the Court stated that Lopez was "a
local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently
moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his pos-
session of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce. '"1 4
In order to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court claimed it
"would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States. °1 0 5
7. THE AFTERMATH OF LOPEZ
The Lopez decision has prompted a flood of federal appeals based
on Commerce Clause grounds and debate regarding the potential long-
term effect that the holding would have on Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. Some argue that Lopez will result in few changes, and they view
the decision an incongruent anomaly.' 06 Others believe the decision will
spark a return to federalism.10 7  Noticing that oral arguments for the
case were held on November 8, 1994, the same day Republicans won
control of Congress, other observers claim the decision reflects Con-
gress' vow to reduce the federal government. 108 Another legal scholar
claims that, at the very least, Lopez will result in substantial litigation
costs in an effort to figure out what Lopez means." Despite the incon-
clusive debates over the long-term effect, one of the most immediate
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 567.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Compare Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 643, 648
(1996), with Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 14, (1995).
107. See sources cited supra note 106.
108. See generally Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and
Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 845 (1996).
109. Judge Louis H. Pollak, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 533, 551
(1995).
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results was a call to legislators to examine more closely the ties between
legislation and interstate commerce. 1 °
Regardless of Lopez's transformation of Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, no additional statutes have been invalidated, and only a hand-
ful of cases have been overturned on Commerce Clause grounds.1
Nevertheless, there are some notable decisions wherein Lopez has been
used to overturn holdings on Commerce Clause grounds. In United
States v. Pappadopoulos,1 12 the Ninth Circuit overruled a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the federal arson statute. 1 3 The court found it
insufficient that the residence in question received natural gas from an
out-of-state source in order to tie it to interstate commerce. 14 The court
also applied the "traditional realm of the state" test announced in Lopez.
It concluded, "This is a simple state arson crime. It should have been
tried in state court."11 5
In the Third Circuit case of United States v. Bishop,"6 the defend-
ant challenged his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, the federal
carjacking statute.11 7 He argued that under Lopez, Congress exceeded
its Commerce Clause power in enacting the law. Although the convic-
tion was ultimately affirmed, there was a very strong dissent 1 8 that
demonstrated the confusion of the Lopez holding. In his dissent, Justice
Becker stated that "[he] view[ed] Lopez as a beacon that we must fol-
low, and the direction in which the beacon points compels my vote to
invalidate the carjacking statute as beyond the broad reach of Congress'
Commerce Clause power." 119 Justice Becker strongly maintained that
non-commercial intrastate crimes, even if they receive national media
coverage, are of a strictly local, state concern.1 20 Despite this disagree-
ment over Lopez, the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly
denied certiorari to Lopez challenge cases, perhaps indicating its reluc-
tance to further strengthen its limits on Congress' Commerce Clause
powers.121 For instance, the Court is willing to let a Fourth Circuit fed-
eral arson conviction stand where the receipt of electricity from an inter-
110. See notes 126-29.
111. See note 109; United States v. Denalli 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1996).
112. 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995).
113. Id. at 530.
114. Id. at 527.
115. Id. at 528.
116. 66 F.3d 569 (3rd Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 571.
118. Id. at 590.
119. Id. at 591.
120. Id.
121. See generally Kathleen Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE WEs. REs. L. REv. 801, 833 (1996).
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state grid was found to be a sufficient a tie to interstate commerce.122
Yet, Justice Scalia said he would grant the petition and "remand the case
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further
consideration in light of United States v. Lopez. 123
The Lopez decision marks another swing of the pendulum in Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. In the four years since its swing, it has
been difficult to determine the actual affect it has had upon Commerce
Clause cases, as the Supreme Court has been reluctant to answer the
question with similarly-held cases. Perhaps the answer will come from a
Lopez challenge to the Violence Against Women Act. This note main-
tains that when the Supreme Court reviews Morrison, the issue of Con-
gress' Commerce Clause authority to pass the VAWA will not withstand
the Lopez analysis.
II. HISTORY AND PASSAGE OF THE VAWA
To better understand the constitutional challenges regarding the
VAWA and how withstanding those challenges may provide expanded
federal protection for sexual orientation it is necessary to know the ori-
gins of the VAWA. Violence against women is a growing and pervasive
problem in the United States. In 1990, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion recorded 100,000 reported cases of rape. This, however, only repre-
sents 7% of all rapes. 24 The number of women battered every year is
between three and four million victims, with one million requiring medi-
cal attention for their injuries. 125 Before the Violence Against Women
Bill was created, there was an overall increase in violence within the
nation, but the rate of assaults against women increased twice as fast as
those against men. Furthermore, the rate of sexual assault increased four
times faster than the overall crime rate. 126
1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As a result of these astonishing numbers, several federal legislators
attempted to confront the problem. On January 14, 1991, Senator
Joseph Biden, Jr. introduced Bill S. 15, the Violence Against Women
122. See United States v. Ramsey, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103
(1995).
123. Ramsey v. United States, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995).
124. See generally Elizabeth Brown, Legislation Aims to Aid Victims of Rape, THE CHRISTIAN
SCtENCE MONITOR, Apr. 1, 1991, at 9.
125. See Jacqueline Frank, Spiraling Violence Against Women Prompts Congress to Act,
REUTERS, Dec. 12, 1990.
126. See Brown, National Action is Needed to Stop Violence Against Women, SEATTLE TIMEs,
June 6, 1991, at A19.
[Vol. 54:587
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
Act of 1991, to the U.S. Senate. 27 On March 20, 1991, Representative
Barbara Boxer introduced a similar version of the Act to the House of
Representatives. 8 In the Senate, the Bill was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which held hearings on April 9, 1991. The House
of Representatives version of the Bill was referred to five committees:
the Judiciary, Public Works and Transportation, Energy and Commerce,
Education and Labor, and Interior and Insular Affairs Committees.
Hearings regarding the Bill lasted almost four years. These hearings
include distinct legislative findings that may very well be the VAWA's
strongest post-Lopez defense against constitutional challenge. The
VAWA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress was very con-
cerned with the extent of gender-based crimes, their effects on the lives
of women, and in turn their effect on interstate commerce. In a 1991
report, the Senate concluded as follows:
Violent attacks by men now tops the list of dangers to an American
woman's health. Every 15 seconds, a woman is battered, and, every
6 minutes a woman is raped in the United States. Last year, more
women were beaten by their husbands than were married. 1990 saw
a record number of rapes reported to the police. Our family homicide
rate is higher than the total homicide rate for countries like Germany
or Denmark... Drunk driving, heart attacks, and cancer, not violent
attacks by men, are commonly perceived to be the most serious
health threats to women. Yet the figures clearly demonstrate that vio-
lence puts women at greater risk.' 29
In addition, the House of Representatives reported the following
statistics:
An estimated 4 million American women are battered each year by
their husbands or partners. Approximately 95% of all domestic vio-
lence victims are women. About 35% of women visiting hospital
emergency rooms are there due to injuries sustained as a result of
domestic violence. One study of battered women found that 63 per-
cent of the victims had been beaten while they were pregnant.1 30
The Senate found that gender-based violence has serious conse-
quences on a national level.13' For example, it discourages women from
interstate travel, prevents them from entering the workplace due to fear
of violence, and burdens the national healthcare system that provides
127. See S. 15, 102d Cong. (1991).
128. See H.R. 1502, 102d Cong. (1991).
129. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 36 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
130. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
131. See S. REP. No 102-197, at 53 (1991); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)
(stating similar facts for the 1994 bill); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993) (stating similar facts for
the 1993 bill).
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care after the violence.' 32 From these facts, the Senate concluded that
gender-based violence and the fear of gender-based violence prevent
women from complete participation in the national economy and, thus,
affect interstate commerce. 133 Furthermore, the Senate found that the
"criminal justice system is not providing equal protection of the laws of
women, in the classic sense."' 34 The Senate believed that the state crim-
inal justice systems were not providing adequate relief. Women contin-
uously encountered the hurdles of immunity doctrines, local prejudice,
unreasonable proof requirements, and the inability or unwillingness to
enforce the law.'35 Thus in 1994, Congress exercised its authority under
the Commerce Clause and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
pass the Violence Against Women Act.' 36
2. STRUCTURE OF THE VAWA
Enacted as part of the 1994 Crime Control Act,'37 the VAWA pro-
vides criminal and civil remedies for crimes of violence motivated by
gender. The VAWA includes several criminal provisions for gender
motivated violence that clearly incorporate a jurisdictional element for
the interstate enforcement of such crimes:
A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian
country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's
spouse or intimate partner, and who in the course of, or as a result of
such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby
causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall be pun-
ished as provided.' 38
Because the interstate enforcement provisions of the VAWA are
codified in the criminal section of the United States Code, the provision
extends to all criminal penalties in the VAWA. The explicit jurisdic-
tional element stated in the criminal section is very likely to withstand a
Commerce Clause challenge. The civil rights provision of the VAWA,
on the other hand, raises some concerns.
The most interesting, yet controversial aspect of the VAWA is the
civil rights provision. According to 42 U.S.C. § 13981, the civil rights
section, the purpose of provision is:
132. See id.
133. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993); S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 52-53 (1991).
134. S. REP. No 102-197, at 53 (1991).
135. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 44-48.
136. See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, PUB. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1902 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
137. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994).
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Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as
under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of
this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of
action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.' 3
9
Furthermore, the VAWA defines the term "crime of violence moti-
vated by gender" as a crime of violence "committed because of gender
or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on
the victim's gender." 140 In addition, the civil rights part of the VAWA
defines "crime of violence" as follows:
[A]n act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the con-
duct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that
would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses
described in section 16 of Title 18, whether or not those acts have
actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and
whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime,
territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and .. includes
an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in
subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who
takes such action and the individual against whom such action is
taken. 1
4 1
It is clear that the VAWA civil rights provision does not contain the
explicit "jurisdiction hook" language like the criminal provision. In
comparing the two, the criminal provision necessitates that the perpetra-
tor must travel across a state line or enter or leave Indian country in
order for the VAWA to apply. There is no comparable provision in the
civil rights section. This absence leaves open a critical question regard-
ing the VAWA's constitutionality based on the Commerce Clause juris-
prudence. Especially after the 1995 holding in Lopez, this issue may be
crucial in determining the constitutionality of the VAWA.
Iml. Two KEY CASES INVOLVING THE VAWA
As could be predicted, the VAWA's enactment was quickly chal-
lenged as having exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority.' 4 2
The first two federal district courts to hear these challenges initially
139. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(a)-(b) (1994).
142. See generally Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D.Conn. 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
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reached opposite conclusions. It is helpful to examine both cases in
order to gain an understanding for the arguments that can be made for
and against the VAWA's Commerce Clause constitutionality. In Doe v.
Doe,'4 3 the court upheld the VAWA, but it did so without recognizing
the limits which the recently decided Lopez places on Congress' Com-
merce Clause authority. In contrast, the federal district court in
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
(Brzonkala I)144 held that Congress did not have the authority within the
Commerce Clause to enact the VAWA. This note examines both of
these key cases.
1. DOE V. DOE
The plaintiff in Doe alleged that her husband "systematically and
continuously inflicted a violent pattern of physical and mental abuse and
cruelty upon [her]." 14 Mrs. Doe claimed that the abuse included throw-
ing her to the floor, kicking her, throwing sharp objects and dangerous
objects at her, threatening to kill her, and destroying property belonging
to her.146 She also alleged that her husband forced her to be "a 'slave'
and perform all manual labor, including maintaining and laying out his
clothes for his numerous dates with his many girlfriends and
mistresses."'
147
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the VAWA claim-
ing that Congress did not have the authority to regulate an activity that
arguably does not affect interstate commerce.'48 Further, he claimed
that Congress could not regulate state criminal and family law, as those
areas are traditionally left to state control.1 49 The court denied his
motion to dismiss, and it found him liable under the VAWA. 5 ° In the
opinion, the court addressed the Commerce Clause challenge first.
The Doe court employed the rational basis test to evaluate the
VAWA under the Commerce Clause. It explained that it would uphold
the statute if it found that "a rational basis existed for concluding that a
regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce" and that
"the means chosen by Congress are 'reasonably adapted to the end per-
mitted by the Constitution."""' The court greatly deferred to Congress
143. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
144. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).




149. See id. at 612.
150. Id. at 610.
151. Id. at 612 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964)).
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by finding that a rational basis did exist.
The court noted that:
In considering whether a comprehensive federal approach was
needed to address systematic, gender-based violent crime, Congress
held numerous hearings over a four-year period and amassed substan-
tial documentation on how gender-based violence impacts interstate
commerce and interferes with women's ability to enjoy equal protec-
tion of the laws. Congressional committees heard testimony from
law enforcement officials, anti-domestic violence organizations, rape
crisis centers, psychiatrists, other mental health experts, physicians,
law professors, staff attorneys from legal advocacy groups, state
Attorneys General, and victims of domestic violence. Congress also
reviewed U.S. Justice Department statistics and studies of gender bias
in state courts commissioned by seventeen state supreme courts.'52
Furthermore, the court went into great detail regarding the Congres-
sional findings used in VAWA enactment, actually citing a "laundry list"
of statistics."5 3 According to the Doe court, the VAWA findings, unlike
those in Lopez, were based on actual evidence rather than "theoretical
impact arguments."' 54 This data proved to the court that domestic vio-
lence does substantially affect interstate commerce without "piling infer-
ence upon inference."' 155 The court concluded that "[t]he Congressional
findings and reports qualitatively and quantitatively demonstrate the
substantial effect on interstate commerce of gender-based violence, in
marked distinction to the Gun Free School Zones Act challenged in
Lopez which lacked such analysis, only theoretical impact
arguments."
56
Notably, the Doe court also compared the VAWA to the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act upheld in Wickard v. Filburn. 57 The court also
noted that Congress' findings demonstrated that gender-based violence
has a "repetitive nationwide impact on" on women's participation in the
marketplace. 58 The court implied that this nationwide impact is similar
to the "aggregate affects" homegrown wheat would have on the national
economy as seen in Wickard.159
While the Doe court recognized many portions of Lopez, it also
ignored certain aspects. The court purported to focus its Commerce
Clause challenge around Lopez, but it claimed that "Lopez did not over-
152. Id. at 611.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 613.
155. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
156. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613.
157. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
158. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14.
159. Id.
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turn or limit the rationality test."' 6° In so doing, the court ignored the
economic activity and jurisdiction limitation aspects of the Lopez hold-
ing and declared the federalism language dicta. 16 ' Nevertheless, the
court chose to focus solely on the Congressional findings aspect of the
holding. According to the Doe court, rather than limiting the scope of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, Lopez merely adds
the element of Congressional findings to the rational basis test. 162
This interpretation of Lopez seems inaccurate because Lopez clearly
limits the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority and markedly
changes the test for Commerce Clause constitutionality. The Doe court
seems to merely fit its case into just one facet of the Lopez framework,
namely the Congressional findings aspect (arguably a less significant
portion). Yet, this appears to be the way in which similar VAWA chal-
lenges are being rebutted. What could reasonably be viewed as a minor
holding (some may argue even dicta) in the Lopez decision, seems to be
the one aspect of the case that repeatedly defends the VAWA from
challenge. 63
2. BRZONKALA V. VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND
STATE UNIVERSITY
In the initial decision of Brzonkala I, the Western District of Vir-
ginia ruled in favor of the defendant and held that, in light of Lopez, the
VAWA was not within Congress' Commerce Clause authority." 6 Sub-
sequently the plaintiff appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Brzonkala II, voted two-to-one to uphold the constitutional-
ity of the VAWA. 165 That decision, however, only lasted for six weeks,
when the Fourth Circuit granted a request to vacate the decision and
granted a rehearing en banc (Brzonkala III).166 The oral arguments for
that hearing en banc were held on March 3, 1998. On March 5, 1999,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an en banc decision, held the
VAWA to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause power. 167
One must analyze the other side of the Lopez argument, the side
contrary to the Doe holding, in order to gain an understanding of an
160. Id. at 613.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 612.
163. Id.
164. See generally Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnical Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779
(W.D. Va. 1996).
165. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F. 3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
166. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
167. Id. at 826.
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alternative interpretation of Lopez. Additionally, although the initial
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel decision has been vacated, it will
provide us with helpful counter arguments to Brzonkala I and may shed
some light onto whether the VAWA will survive constitutional
challenge.
a. The Facts
Christy Brzonkala is an adult woman who attended Virginia Poly-
technic and State University. 6 ' On the night of September 21, 1994,
leading into the morning of the next day, Brzonkala was raped in her
third floor dormitory by two university football players she and her
roommate met half an hour before. 169
Initially, Brzonkala and her roommate, Hope Handley, along with
the two football players Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, were
present in the dorm room. Handley and Crawford left the room after
fifteen minutes of conversation. 170 Subsequently Morrison requested
intercourse with Brzonkala, who audibly responded "no" twice and
attempted to leave. Morrison forced her onto the bed, face-up, pushed
her down by her shoulders and forcibly took off her clothes. 171 He used
his hands to pin her down by the elbows, pressed his knees against her
legs, and forced her to submit to vaginal intercourse. 172 Brzonkala
attempted to push Morrison off, but, before she could recover, Crawford
returned, switched places with Morrison, and raped her in a similar man-
ner.173 Crawford then exchanged places with Morrison who raped
Brzonkala again. Neither Morrison nor Crawford used a condom.
1 74
After raping her a second time, Morrison warned Brzonkala, "You
better not have any [f-ing] diseases."1 75 Several weeks later, Morrison
announced publicly in the dormitory cafeteria, and in the presence of at
least one female student, "I like to get girls drunk and [f-] the [sh-]
out of them."'
176
In April of 1995, Brzonkala filed a formal complaint with the Uni-
versity under its sexual assault policy. 177 A judicial committee, in a
hearing held by the University, found Morrison guilty of sexual assault
168. Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 781.
169. See id. at 781-82.
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and suspended him for two semesters. The evidence against Crawford
was found to be insufficient to take action.1 78 After a second hearing
and a subsequent appeal, the University lifted Morrison's suspension,
enabling him to return to classes in the fall of 1995. The University
failed to inform Brzonkala of his impending return, and she only found
out about it later through a newspaper article.' 79 Brzonkala canceled her
plans to return to the University amidst fear for her personal safety and
choose instead to live with her parents and attend a college closer to
home. '80
In March of 1996, Brzonkala filed a complaint with the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging viola-
tions of Title IX of the Education Amendment Act, 8' violation of Title
III of the VAWA,182 and several state law claims. This action was
brought against the University, William Landsidle, Comptroller of the
Commonwealth, and three University football players (Antonio Morri-
son, James Crawford, and Cornell Brown). The claims against the Uni-
versity, Landsidle, and Brown were dismissed. 83 The court only
considered the VAWA issue and some of the state law claims against
Morrison and Crawford.1 84
b. The Law
Initially, the court determined whether Brzonkala's complaint
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court measured the suffi-
ciency of the VAWA claim by determining whether Brzonkala had ade-
quately alleged that her rape was a "crime of violence motivated by
gender." '85 After finding that the complaint was sufficient, the court
relied upon "generally accepted guidelines" for identifying hate crimes
and considered the following characteristics used to determine whether a
crime is bias related: "[the] language used by the perpetrator; the sever-
ity of the attack (including mutilation); the lack of provocation; previous
history of similar incidents; absence of any other apparent motive (bat-
tery without a robbery, for example; common sense." 186 The court




181. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
183. See Brzonkala 1, 935 F.Supp. at 781.
184. Id.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994).
186. Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 784 (quoting S. Rep. No. 197, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 50 n.
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than in some other types of rape." '187 In conclusion, the court held that
"[t]he characteristics of the rape combined with Morrison's statements
are sufficient at least to meet the minimal federal pleading
requirement." 88
In so holding, the court considered the following characteristics of
the rapes: this was a gang rape, indicating a conspiracy of disrespect for
women; this was a stranger rape, indicating disrespect solely on the basis
of the victim's gender, as the perpetrators had no knowledge of her per-
sonality; and the comments made by Morrison immediately and some-
time after the rape, as further evidence of his disrespect for Brzonkala,
and women in general. 189 The court ruled that, as against Morrison,
Brzonkala had sufficiently stated a VAWA claim pursuant to federal
minimum pleading requirements. As against Crawford, the court found
it unnecessary to decide whether Brzonkala had stated a claim because
the court's decision would ultimately render the VAWA
unconstitutional. 190
The court applied a very strict interpretation of the recently-decided
Lopez decision to find that the VAWA was an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. The Brzonkala I court reiter-
ated the Lopez framework, stating:
Under its commerce power, Congress may regulate three broad cate-
gories of activity. First, Congress may regulate the use of the chan-
nels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress may regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of commerce or the persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Third, Congress may regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 19 1
The Court then summarily dismissed the first two categories of per-
missible regulation as inapplicable, thus focusing its analysis on whether
the VAWA regulated an activity that had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 192
The Brzonkala court, in its application of the Lopez standard to the
case at bar, cited the congressional findings in support of the VAWA,
but it quickly dismissed them by using direct language from the Lopez
opinion: "Notably, the Lopez Court stated, '[S]imply because Congress
may conclude that a particular activity affects interstate commerce does
187. Id. at 784.
188. Id. at 785.
189. Id. at 784-85.
190. Id. at 785, 801.
191. Id. at 786.
192. Id.
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not necessarily make it SO.' ,,193 The court also asserted, "'Whether par-
ticular operation affects interstate commerce sufficiently to come under
the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial question, and can be settled finally on by this Court."' 194
Next, the court compared the differences between the regulated
activity in Lopez with the regulated activity in the case at bar. The court
found the lack of congressional findings in Lopez and the abundant con-
gressional findings in Brzonkala to be insignificant. 95 As quoted above,
congressional findings do not always dictate that the activity indeed
affects interstate commerce. Then, the court dealt with the assertion that
the statute at issue is civil while the Lopez Gun Free School Zones Act
was criminal. The court determined that this was not necessarily cor-
rect, in that the VAWA is criminal in nature "designed to address
problems in the state criminal justice system .... it creates a civil cause
of action that seeks to vindicate a criminal act."' 96 It also found this
difference to be inconsequential.
The court discussed another possible difference found in the "steps
of causation" as fewer in the case at bar than in Lopez. 197 The steps of
causation refer to how distant the regulated activity actually is from
affecting interstate commerce. The court dismissed this difference with
the following: "Even accepting the step analysis as helpful and accepting
that the case at hand involves fewer steps than the situation in Lopez,
both situations involve regulated activity which is too remote from inter-
state commerce."'198 Thus, the court determined that any differences
between the two cases were inconsequential and need not be given any
real consideration.
The court focused on the similarities between the two cases. First,
the two statutes involved a regulation of an intrastate activity that is not
commercial in nature. It claimed that the VAWA, like the Gun Free
Zone Act of 1990, simply regulated local criminal activity. 199 Further,
the court summarily discounted the Wickard aggregate affect theory as
was espoused in the VAWA's and Gun Free School Zones Act's "cost of
crime" arguments.
In addition, the court looked at the lack of a jurisdictional nexus in
both statutes, claiming that neither statute had a jurisdictional element:
193. Id. at 788 (citing Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1629, citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. concurring)).
194. Id. at 788-89 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. at 273).
195. Id. at 789.
196. Id. at 790.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 791.
199. Id.
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"Although it is unclear whether such a jurisdictional requirement is
needed, indications exist that such a requirement may be necessary." 2"
The court cited several cases to that effect.2° 1 Finally, the court cited the
last similarity: "[S]imilar to the situation in Lopez, permitting the
VAWA as a constitutional exercise of the commerce power would have
the practical result of excessively extending Congress's power and of
inappropriately tipping the balance away from the states. 20 2
After weighing the similarities of Lopez against the "insignificant"
differences, the court poured salt in the VAWA's wounds by stating,
"Showing that something affects the national economy does not suffice
to show that it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce." 20 3 The
court claimed that if such a chain of causation sufficed, Congress' power
would extend to an unbounded extreme:
Defendants point out that facts show that insomnia costs the United
States $15 billion a year .... This is as much as the yearly cost of
domestic abuse. Other sources indicate that the cost of insomnia is
much higher .... Insomnia undoubtedly also has some effect on
interstate travel as insomniacs travel across state lines for treatment
.... However, to extend Congress's power to these issues would
unreasonably tip the balance away from the states. 2°
Ultimately the court concluded, "The combination of the insignifi-
cance of the differences between the case at hand and Lopez and the
significance of the similarities leads to the conclusion that Congress
acted beyond its commerce power in enacting VAWA."2 °5
3. BRZONKALA'S APPEAL TO THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Brzonkala subsequently filed an appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals.2" The three judge panel voted two-to-one to uphold the
constitutionality of the VAWA, thus reversing the district court. 20 7 Its
ruling survived only six weeks, until it granted a request to vacate the
decision and grant a rehearing en banc. Although the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the earlier panel's ruling, it is important to
examine the rationale behind the majority and dissenting opinions,
which provide some interesting perspective on the VAWA debate.




204. Id. at 793 (citations omitted).
205. Id.
206. See Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
207. Id.
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The panel's majority upheld the constitutionality of the VAWA.2 °8
The court analyzed the Lopez decision by first determining whether
Congress had a rational basis to find the connection to interstate com-
merce and, next, by determining whether the VAWA abrogated state
authority. The majority held that Congress did indeed have a rational
basis in finding the connection to interstate commerce. It held that Con-
gress was regulating an area that was quintessentially federal.2" The
dissent, on the other hand, suggested that the majority's ruling was an
analytically superficial interpretation of Lopez. It further claimed that
the majority suffered from a "manifest misreading of the Supreme
Court's historically significant Lopez decision."21°
The majority started its analysis of the case with Congress's "volu-
minous findings," which supported the connection between interstate
commerce and gender-motivated crimes.211  The majority panel
grounded Congress' rational basis on these findings, using such lan-
guage as "numerous and specific findings and a mountain of evidence,"
"detailed and extensive," and "exhaustive and meticulous investiga-
tion." '2 12 It relied upon the Lopez proposition that Congress' rational
basis for linking an intrastate activity to interstate commerce must be
identified through congressional findings. The Fourth Circuit has con-
sistently upheld Commerce Clause cases on less stringent findings,
therefore, it was no surprise that the panel majority had "no hesitation
similarly upholding the VAWA."21 3
The majority's opinion did not end with the rational basis test. It
went further to discuss whether the VAWA intrudes upon areas tradi-
tionally left to the state.214 First, the panel majority reasoned that the
VAWA was a civil rights statute, not a criminal statute.215 Understood
this way, the VAWA did not abrogate any authority traditionally left to
the state, such as criminal law, and was well within the federal realm of
civil rights. The panel majority stated that civil rights had been a "fed-
eral responsibility since shortly after the Civil War," making federal
civil rights legislation a "quintessential area of federal expertise. '216
Next, the panel majority noted that Congress not only understood
its Commerce Clause authority when it enacted the VAWA, but it took
208. Id. at 974.
209. Id. at 963-73.
210. Id. at 974 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
211. See id. at 968.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 970-71.
215. Id. at 970.
216. Id. at 971.
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that power seriously and acted within its well-established boundaries.2 17
Thus, the majority held that the VAWA was a constitutional exercise of
Congress' Commerce Clause authority.218
The dissenting opinion, written by Circuit Judge Luttig, suggested
that the majority's opinion had made a fundamental mistake in misread-
ing Lopez because it had conducted only a superficial analysis of the
nexus between interstate commerce and gender-motivated violence.21 9
Particularly, the dissent chastised the majority opinion because it
"merely recit[ed] several statements from the House and Senate commit-
tees... and then simply stat[ed], without more, that the Act [was] con-
stitutional. ' 220 The dissent's main concern was that the majority had
failed to apply the Lopez requirement that the court conduct an
"independent evaluation" of the connection.22' The panel dissent argued
that Congress' findings were no more than a mere single conclusory
statement that there was a connection, a finding that was "functionally
no different from a complete absence of express congressional find-
"1222ings. It claimed that the majority had acted as if Lopez had never
been decided, and it concluded with a prediction that the Supreme Court
would not allow such a "bold intransigence in the face of the Court's
recent [Lopez] decision .... ",223 The dissenting opinion obviously did
not go unheard, for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
panel decision merely six weeks after it had been rendered.
4. FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS EN BANC PROCEEDING
After an en banc hearing, and a year of deliberation, having
received an onslaught of amici briefs, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal ruled that the Violence Against Women Act was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power.224 The court's
opinion, written by Justice Luttig (the dissenter in the previous Court of
Appeals ruling) relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's rational in
Lopez to strike down the VAWA. It is useful to examine the court's
opinion in detail, to gain a better understanding of the arguments that
will surface when the Supreme Court hears this case.
"We the People, distrustful of power, and believing that govern-
ment limited and dispersed protects freedom best, provided that our fed-
217. Id. at 973.
218. Id. at 974.
219. See generally id. at 974-78.
220. Id. at 974.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 976.
223. Id. at 977.
224. See Brzonkala 11, 169 F. 3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
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eral government would be one of enumerated powers, and that all power
enumerated would be reserved to the several and to ourselves. 225 The
opinion, from beginning to end, was a grandiose and arguably eloquent
manifesto of states' rights, as if Judge Luttig were really getting the last
laugh on the matter. "These simple truths of power bestowed and power
withheld under the Constitution have never been more relevant than in
this day, when accretion, if not actual accession, of power to the federal
government seems not only unavoidable, but even expedient. ''226
The court delved into the VAWA by first recognizing that it was
enacted in "response to the problems of domestic violence, sexual
assault, and other forms of violent crime against women. 2 27 It went on
recognize that the VAWA contained a "host of provisions, only one of
which we address today. '228 The focus of the ruling was on § 13981(c),
the civil rights remedy of the statute. After providing the factual back-
ground of the case and its procedural history, the court addressed the
threshold issue of the case: whether Brzonkala had stated a claim under
§ 13981 sufficient to withstand appellees' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.2 29
The court found that Brzonkala had properly stated a claim. 23° As that
threshold issue was resolved, the court moved on to address the issue of
whether § 13981 "represent[ed] a constitutional exercise of Congress'
power under either the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, or Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. '231 Because City of Boerne v.
Flores23 2 had eliminated any defense based on Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the court moved directly to the Commerce Clause
issue.
The opinion focused on the Supreme Court's 1995 ruling in Lopez,
particularly on the "substantially affects" test announced in that case.
The court was convinced that the "substantially affects" test established
the outer limits of congressional Commerce Clause power. It claimed:
Lopez made clear that such power does not extend to the regulation of
activities that merely have some relationship with or effect upon
interstate commerce, but, rather, extends only, as is relevant here, to
those activities 'having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
225. Id. at 825-26.
226. Id. at 826.
227. Id. at 827.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 828.
230. Id. at 829.
231. Id. at 830.
232. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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commerce.' 233
Next, the court discussed two types of laws Lopez upheld as regula-
tions of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce: "(1) 'reg-
ulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects inter-
state commerce' . . . and (2) regulations that include a jurisdictional
element.... 234
In analyzing the first type of permissible laws, the court found that
the VAWA deals only with gender-based crimes, not economic-based
crimes, and "thus explicitly excludes from its purview those violent
crimes most likely to have an economic aspect - crimes arising solely
from economic motives - and instead addresses violent crimes arising
from the irrational motive of gender animus, a type of crime relatively
unlikely to have any economic character at all. '235 The court also dis-
missed the argument that section 13981 was "'an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity"' that may be valid.236 As a
result, the court found that section 13981 did not fit into the first permis-
sible category of laws established by Lopez.
Additionally, the court found that section 13981 did not have the
necessary jurisdictional nexus that would validate it under the second set
of permissible laws. 237 The court concluded that "[b]ecause section
13981 neither regulates an economic activity nor includes a jurisdic-
tional element, it cannot be upheld on the authority of Lopez or any other
Supreme Court holding demarcating the outer limits of Congress' power
under the substantially affects test. '238 Finally, the court delivered an
"in the alternative," "federalism concerns" argument, reasoning that
even if these two categories did not demarcate the absolute outer limit of
congressional authority, they certainly demarcated the presumptive outer
limits. 239
The court then addressed the appellants' attempt to link gender-
based violence to interstate commerce by arguing that "violence moti-
vated by gender animus imposes medical and legal costs upon its vic-
tims" and that it "discourages those who fear such violence from
traveling, working, or transacting business at times or in places that they
233. Brzonkala III, 169 F. 3d at 7 830-31 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-
59 (1995)).
234. Id. at 831.
235. Id. at 834.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 836.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 837-38.
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consider unsafe," thus deterring some interstate employment.240 As the
arguments mirror those eviscerated in Lopez, so too are they eviscerated
here:
It is unsurprising that appellants must resort to such arguments. Just
as it is impossible to link violence motivated by gender animus with
any particular, identifiable economic transaction or enterprise ... it is
similarly impossible to link such violence with a particular interstate
market or with any specific obstruction of interstate commerce.241
Furthermore, the court reiterated its federalism concerns, claiming
that section 13981 would encroach upon areas traditionally left to the
separate states: "[I]n this case, concerns of federalism, far from hypo-
thetical, are immediate and concrete. '242 The court continued, "For
when the federal government provides a remedy for violent crime in
addition to that provided by the States, it both involves itself in the pun-
ishment of such crime and increases the total penalty for such crime
beyond that provided by the laws of the States. 2 43 The court thus con-
cluded that VAWA encroached upon states' control over criminal issues.
It further asserted that state family law, the most traditional of state reg-
ulation would also be abrogated. 2 "
The court next addressed the appellant's argument that Lopez called
for legislative findings in order to validate laws enacted under the Com-
merce Clause. This arises as one of the major issues tackled in virtually
every VAWA case because many construe Lopez as meaning that
through sufficient legislative findings, a law with questionable interstate
commerce connections may be permissible. This understanding is based
upon one short section in Lopez, where the court stated that legislative
findings "would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment
that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce,
even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye. 245
The Brzonkala court, however, also noted that Lopez had warned,
"'[simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so.' "246
The court continued by reiterating that the question of whether par-
ticular activities substantially affect interstate commerce is a judicial
question, and the court cannot absolutely rely upon the strength of such
240. Id. at 838.
241. Id. at 839.
242. Id. at 840.
243. Id. at 841.
244. Id. at 843.
245. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
246. Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 845 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
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congressional findings.247 Further, the court noted that Lopez could not
"reasonably be understood to have turned on a mere lack of documenta-
tion .... [because] had the Court desired only legislative corroboration
of the government's arguments, it could easily have consulted these
findings, and presumably would have done so. '"248
Finally, the Brzonkala court concluded that if the Lopez court had
intended for congressional findings to be a proxy for an interstate com-
merce determination, it "would have constituted not a substantive limita-
tion on congressional power, but rather a mere procedural hurdle-in
essence, a remand to Congress to make formal findings or compile a
formal record. 249
The opinion ended with a final anti-federalist sentiment:
Here, as in Lopez, the power that Congress has asserted is essentially
limitless; the existence of findings or documentation, standing alone,
does not provide the type of meaningful limitation on congressional
power required by a Constitution that withholds from Congress 'a
general police power of the sort retained by the States.'25°
IV. HATE CRIMES STATISTICS ACT
1. BACKGROUND
Over the last decade, hate crimes have received increasingly more
publicity through the media and accordingly have commanded the legis-
lature's attention. In addition, there have been notable developments in
federal law that address hate crimes. Among the most influential and
important developments is the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 (the
HCSA),25 1 which authorizes the Attorney General to collect data on enu-
merated crimes that "manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, reli-
gion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity" from local police departments.252
Unlike the hate crime laws passed by many state legislatures, the HCSA
is merely a statistics gathering law and is strictly limited to that function.
Compliance with the HCSA, however, remains voluntary, and many cit-
ies do not participate in the HCSA. Of the jurisdictions that do partici-
pate, many continually report zero hate crimes.
The HCSA is designed to serve several purposes. First, it seeks to
gather the empirical data necessary for the development of effective pol-
247. Id.
248. Id. at 846.
249. Id. at 848.
250. Id. at 852 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
251. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994)).
252. Id. § l(b)(l), 104 Stat. 140 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994)) (applying to
crimes of murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault; simple assault;
intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage, or vandalism or property).
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icies to fight hate-motivated violence. Further, it raises the public's
awareness of hate-motivated crimes and underscores the need for an
official state and federal response. Most importantly, the HCSA
requires police department involvement in the process of identifying and
accounting for hate crimes, which may aid law enforcement officials in
measuring trends, fashioning effective responses, designing prevention
strategies, and developing sensitivity training particular to the needs of
hate crime victims.
The HCSA was supported by a strong coalition of civil rights
groups that focused on the creation of a government-run system with
local police department, involvement to collect data, report on hate
crimes, and train law enforcement officers to identify and respond to
hate crimes. Many government officials agreed with this approach, and,
in 1983, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recommended that federal
and state authorities "develop workable reporting systems that will pro-
duce an accurate and comprehensive measurement of the extent of crim-
inal activity that is clearly based on racial and/or religious
motivations. '253 The HCSA represents an advance in the battle against
hate crimes in that it is the first federal legislation requiring the govern-
ment to collect specific data on hate crimes. Further, it recognizes vio-
lence against gays and lesbians as a hate crime.
2. AN OVERVIEW
Section l(b)(1) of the HCSA requires that the Attorney General
acquire data about crimes that "manifest evidence of prejudice based on
race, religion, sexual orientation and ethnicity." These enumerated
crimes include: murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation, arson and destruction,
and damage or vandalism of property. Section l(b)(2) mandates that the
Attorney General establish guidelines for data collection. The guide-
lines should include the necessary evidence and criteria that must be
present for a finding of manifest prejudice, as well as the procedures for
implementing the HCSA. Section l(b)(3) expressly states that the
HCSA does not create a new cause of action or right to bring an action
based on discrimination due to sexual orientation, defined in this section
as "consensual homosexuality or heterosexuality." Although the HCSA
does not create new rights, neither does it limit the right to bring an
action under existing statutes. Section l(b)(4) is a confidentiality mea-
sure, restricting the use of data collected under the HCSA to research
and statistical purposes. Additionally, the data collected may not con-
253. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE: RACIAL AND
RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY IN AMERICA 28 (1983).
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tain any information which might reveal the identity of the individual
victim of a crime. Section l(b)(5) mandates that the Attorney General
publish an annual summary of the data acquired under the HCSA.
Section 2(a) of the HCSA provides the following:
Congress finds that:
The American family life is the foundation of American society,
Federal policy should encourage the well-being, financial security,
and health of the American family Schools should not de-emphasize
the critical value of American family life.
Further, section 2(b), emphasizes that nothing in the Act should be con-
strued to promote or encourage homosexuality, nor that any funds
appropriated to carry out the HCSA would be used for such purposes.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In response to the emergence of high levels of hate-motivated
crimes, two bills requiring the counting of hate crimes were introduced
in the House of Representatives in 1985: H.R. 775 and H.R. 1171. Both
bills were conceived as modest federal efforts against hate-motivated
violence. Initially, the bills focused on tracing crimes motivated by
racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice, thus disregarding crimes based on
sexual orientation.
Organizations created to fight hate crimes, such as the International
Network of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, the Anti-Klan Network, and the
Institute for Prevention and Control of Violence and Extremism, testi-
fied before Congress in support of the bills. 54 The bill moved easily
through the House because it was relatively uncontroversial and simply
called for data gathering; however, the Senate adjourned before it could
pass the bill.
In 1986, the House held special hearings on the religious motivated
violence section of the bill and passed a bill making such violence a
federal crime.255 Unfortunately, the Senate failed to vote on the 1986
bill before adjourning, but the 100th Congress finally passed legislation
criminalizing religious motivated violence. 256
At the same time, the gay and lesbian communities who were
excluded from the legislative initiatives, began data collection of their
own. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) established
its own data collection on violent victimization through community,
254. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act: Hearings on H.R. 1171 and H.R. 775. Before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Commission on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Session. (1985).
255. See H.R. REP. No. 99-820 (1986).
256. See H.R. REP. No. 100-337 (1987); Pub L. No. 100-346 § 1, 102 Stat. 644 (codified in 18
U.S.C. § 247 (1988).
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campus, and religious organizations.257 Pleas by the NGLTF for partici-
pation in and support of studies and programs on hate violence con-
ducted by the Justice Department's National Institute of Justice and its
Office for Victims of Crime, the U.S. Commission of Civil Rights, and
the Center for Disease Control Violence Epidemiology Project were all
denied. 8
In 1985, the NGTLF finally had a voice in Representative Barney
Frank (D-Mass.), who prevailed upon the Criminal Justice Subcommit-
tee of the House Judiciary Committee to conduct an oversight hearing
on the problem of anti-gay violence. The October 9, 1986, hearing pro-
moted discussion on the kinds of anti-gay violence occurring around the
nation, as well as the institutional responses by state and federal agen-
cies. 259 The hearings addressed the shortcomings of federal agencies in
collecting information about anti-gay violence. All participating groups
urged Congress to enact a law to monitor anti-gay violence.
After the hearings, gay and lesbian rights groups joined forces to
support and lobby in favor of a revised bill, which included sexual orien-
tation. The bill adopted by the House in the 100th Congress was the
model for the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, which included the term "sex-
ual orientation," along with race, religion, and ethnicity. The definition
of "sexual orientation" included "male or female heterosexuality, homo-
sexuality, or bisexuality by orientation or practice between consenting
adults. 26o
Of course, the bill was met by severe opposition from party con-
servatives. In a dissent to the Committee Report, five members of the
House Judiciary Committee opposed the inclusion of sexual orientation
in the bill.26 1 They argued that the primary object of the federal hate
crimes statistics bill was to "inspire Federal legislation to counteract hate
crimes or assist in the allocation of Federal law enforcement
resources." 262 They further argued that gays and lesbians possess no
special rights deserving protection by federal legislation or law enforce-
ment efforts and that in the absence of evidence that crime against gays
and lesbians is perpetrated through the use of interstate networks, no
intervention of federal law enforcement is required.263
257. NGLTF, ANTI-GAY VIOLENCE, VICTIMIZATION & DEFAMATION IN 1989, at ii (1990).
258. See Anti-Gay Violence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 16-17, 27 (1986) (testimony of Kevin Berill).
259. See id. at 15-17, 27.
260. H.R. REP. No. 100-575 (1988).
261. See id. at 12 (dissenting view of Representatives Gekas (R-Pa.), McCollum (R-Fla.),
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Representative Conyers, in response to the dissenters' concerns,
noted that the bill simply requires the collection of data to "guide the
efforts of police, prosecutors, and the public" against hate crime.264 A
clear understanding that the bill would not create substantive federal
protection for gays and lesbians was crucial for the passage of the bill,
and it resurfaced throughout the debate over passage. The bill was
reported favorably by the Committee despite the objections, on October
20, 1987.265 In May, 1988, the bill was passed by the full House by a
vote of 388 to 29.266
With the support of law enforcement groups, such as the Police
Executive Research Forum, the National Organization of Black Law
Enforcement Executives, the Criminal Justice Statistics Administration,
and the International Association of Police Chiefs, the coalition began to
push the bill again, as soon as the 101st Congress convened. Alhough
some members of the coalition wanted to add gender to the bill, most
groups believed that the bill would not adequately address gender issues
and that to expand the bill to include gender would not improve the
current data collection on gender-based crimes. Further, some women's
rights groups did not agree that the inclusion of gender in the act was the
appropriate way to count gender-based crimes. Thus, the coalition
decided against including gender in the bill.
The House bill moved quickly through the 101st Congress, passing
only seven days after its reporting, by a vote of 368 to 47. Representa-
tive Dannemeyer (D-Cal.) strenuously objected to the bill, claiming it
would "change the basic definition of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to
include a new status that would have the dignity of being within the
proscription [sic] of that act."2 67
In the interim, the Senate bill was quickly approved by the Judici-
ary Committee on March 9, 1989.268 Yet, Senator Jesse Helms held the
bill in limbo for eleven months. Helms refused to enter into a time
agreement, a procedure that limits the time for debate in which amend-
ments may be offered. As the Senate's strongest voice against gay and
lesbian rights, Senator Helms fought the bill on the ground that it gave
undue protection and respectability to gays and lesbians. His proposed
Helms amendment was countered by amendments by Senators Paul
Simon (D-Ill.) and Orin Hatch (R-Utah).
When the bill finally reached the floor of the Senate, Senators
264. Id. at 8 (concurring view of Representative Conyers).
265. See id. at 6.
266. See 134 Cong. Rec. H3389 (daily ed. May 18, 1988).
267. 135 Cong. Rec. H3179, H3183 (daily ed. June 27, 1989).
268. See S. REP. No. 101-21 at 5 (1989).
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Simon and Hatch engaged Senator Helms in quarrelsome debate. Helms
raised several objections to the bill, which centered around his belief that
the bill did not conform with the sense of traditional family that America
was founded upon. In addition, he argued that the bill would do nothing
to fight crime, but would shift attention "away from actual criminal
behavior and toward motivation behind the behavior. "269 Senator Simon
responded that any attention given to the motivation behind the crimes
would ultimately help to identify and prevent actual criminal behavior.
Next, Senator Helms claimed that the coalition's numbers were
inflated, and that most "violence" against gays and lesbians consisted of
name calling, and did not constitute true crimes. Senator Hatch parried
the argument by diverting attention to those senators who were leery
about appearing pro-gay. He claimed, "It may be that some will try to
use this data to call for gay rights legislation. But I do not see what
good this data will do for that particular issue. '27 ° Finally, Senator
Helms argued that the bill was unworkable because there was no stan-
dard for gathering the data, instead, leaving it up to the Attorney General
to determine. In response, Senator Hatch assured his colleagues that the
Justice Department and the FBI were quite capable of crafting and
implementing statistics guidelines. The Senate, passed the bill unper-
suaded by Helms' arguments, by a 92 to 4 majority.271 The President
signed the bill into law on April 23, 1990, at a public signing ceremony.
4. THE REALITY OF THE HATE CRIME STATISTICS ACT
In reality, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, though novel, is but a
stitch on the laceration of hate crime in America. As a mere statistics
gathering act, it affords absolutely no federal protection to those who are
victimized by hate crime. Unfortunately, gay and lesbian victims with
whom it may be more difficult to discern true hate crimes, remain
overlooked.
When one examines how the act will be implemented, obvious
defects become apparent. "Mistrust and misconceptions about the gay
community and the police lead to two problems. First, victims of sexual
orientation bias crimes either do not report these crimes to police or they
conceal evidence of bias when making their reports. 2 72 Gays' and les-
bians' past experience with police officers, including possible bias on
both parts, may contribute to the fabrication or omission of certain evi-
269. 136 Cong. Rec. S1067, S1076 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1990) (statement of Senator Helms).
270. Id. at 51080 (statement of Senator Hatch).
271. See id. at S1092.
272. Teresa Eileen Kibelstis, Preventing Violence Against Gay Men and Lesbians: Should
Enhanced Penalties at Sentencing Extend to Bias Crimes Based on Victims' Sexual Orientation?,
9 NoTE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'y 309, 318-19.
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dence of bias motivation. This, in turn, seriously undermines the police
department statistics gathering process. A second problem is that
"police may be disregarding evidence of bias crimes when investigating
incidents involving gay and lesbian victims." '273
The most troubling question remaining after the passage of the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act, however, is how the Act will prevent further hate
crimes. While the majority of States have their own hate crimes laws, as
observed in Mathew Shepard's case, there are still states that do not.274
What is needed is actual federal protection for victims of hate crimes.
The closest attempt at arriving at a federal hate crimes law is not
comprehensive. Under 18 U.S.C. § 245, one can be federally prosecuted
for a hate crime, only if the crime was motivated by bias based on race,
religion, national origin, or color, and if the assailant intended to prevent
the victim from exercising a federally protected right. This dual require-
ment of bias motivation and prevention of a federally protected right
seriously limits the efficacy of the law. In response to this limitation and
the limitation imposed by the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, a bill was
finally proposed to enhance federal enforcement of hate crimes: The
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998.
It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the debate over
the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998, although a look at the Act's
intended effects is helpful. The Act would expand federal jurisdiction to
reach serious violent hate crimes, regardless of whether the victim was
exercising a federally protected right. The bill describes hate crime as a
violent act attempting to cause bodily injury "because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, or national origin" or "gender, sexual ori-
entation, or disability" of the victim. 275
In addition, the Act would have the nexus requirement that the per-
petrator traveled in interstate commerce or used the facilities of inter-
state commerce. The bill will likely be met with resistance similar to the
predecessor Hate Crimes Statistic Act. Still, the Act is desperately
needed, given that the Hate Crimes Statistics Act is seriously insufficient
in combating the widespread national problem of hate crimes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Lopez-based arguments are
cogent and portend that the Supreme Court will hold the Violence
Against Women Act unconstitutional. The only argument in support of
273. Id. at 319.
274. Only twenty-one states and the District of Columbia include sexual orientation-based
crimes in their hate crimes statutes.
275. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998, S. 1529, 105th Cong. §4.
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its constitutionality seems to rest on the "congressional findings"
requirement. If the Court does find that the VAWA is constitutional, it
will likely base its decision on the four years of congressional hearings
and voluminous fact-finding as a sufficient demonstration of connection
to interstate commerce. This decision would bode well for further fed-
eral protection for gays and lesbians. The Hate Crimes Statistics Act
may be considered a grand-scale congressional fact-finding and thus
serve as substantial evidence of an interstate commerce connection.
It is more likely, however, that the Court will use Lopez as the outer
demarcation of Congress' power.2 76 This, in turn, would render the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act an ineffectual data gathering tool, rather than a
stepping stone to further protection.
ALEXANDER DOMBROWSKY
276. During the editing of this article, the Supreme Court furthered the Lopez decision. It
announced its continued advance toward "states' rights," rendering the Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 13 FLA. L. WEEKLY FED. §25, No. 98-791 (Jan. 11, 2000) decision. In Kimel, the court
struck down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act thereby allowing abrogation of State's
immunity. This case, argued during the same session as Morrison, protects the unconstitutionality
of the VAWA.
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